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INTRODUCTION

What is a human life worth? What is the value of climbing a
mountain, watching a sunset, or enjoying the warmth of a summer
afternoon? Can one put a price on the pleasures of life-or lack of
them?' Hedonic damages attempt to do just that, to measure the
intangible value of life in personal injury and wrongful death claims.
The term hedonic damages was first devised by Stan V. Smith, a
Chicago economist, to describe the damages suffered by a decedent
for loss of enjoyment of life in the Section 1983 wrongful death case
Sherrod v. Berry.2 While testifying at trial, Smith defined hedonic
value as "the larger value of life, . . . including economic, including
moral, including philosophical, including all the value with which you
might hold life . . . . " Judge Leighton, who heard Smith's testimony
in Sherrod, stated more succinctly, "Hedonic damages measure the
1. See related discussion in Miller, The Price of Life, Reader (Chicago), Sept.
22, 1989, § 1, at 8.
2. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988). In Sherrod, a father filed suit for damages, including
hedonic damages, when his son was mistakenly shot and killed by a policeman. See
infra notes 109-12 and accompanying text for details of the incident giving rise to
Sherrod v. Berry.
3. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988). The name "hedonic"
derives from the Greek word meaning pleasure. Hanna, $1 Million in 'Hedonic'
Damages, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Mar. 21, 1989, at 3, col. 2. Smith has developed an
economic formula for measuring hedonic loss. Essentially, this method of measurement is what distinguishes hedonic damages from its predecessor, damages for loss
of enjoyment of life.
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taking away of the pleasure of being alive." 4 Since Sherrod, hedonic
damages continue to be raised in federal courts where wrongful death
claims are brought under Section 1983. In addition, hedonic damages
are used in personal injury actions to represent recovery for loss of
enjoyment of life beyond that of traditional awards for bodily injury
and pain and suffering. 5
The issue of hedonic damages or damages for loss of enjoyment
of life has been considered in some fashion by a large number of
jurisdictions, 6 but courts and commentators have not clearly articu4. Blodgett, Hedonic Damages: A Price on the Pleasure of Life, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1985, at 25.
5. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Vest, No. 87-L-207 (3d Judicial Cir., Madison Cty.,
Ill., Mar. 17, 1989) (awarding hedonic damages as a component of past and future
disability); Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d 823 (1989) (affirming an award
of $150,000 for loss of enjoyment of life, while holding that loss of enjoyment of
life is a valid subcomponent of pain and suffering and/or disability and may be
argued by counsel to the jury).
6. Case law citing the term hedonic is limited. The term was not coined until
Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd and remanded on other
grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988). Since Sherrod, hedonic damages have been
referred to in the following cases: Clement v. Consolidated Rail Corp., Civ. No. 883793 (CSF) (U.S.D.C., D.N.J., Sept. 22, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database)
(noting that hedonic damages are not available under the wrongful death act, but are
available under the survival statute "for the period between the time of injury and
death"); Peek v. Equipment Serv. Co. of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1989)
(wrongful death and survival action noting hedonic damages as a synonym for loss
of enjoyment of life); Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d 823 (1989) (noting
that damages for loss of enjoyment of life are sometimes referred to as hedonic
damages); Singleton v. Chung Sun Suhr, M.D., No. 89-55367 (Ohio App. May 18,
1989) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (granted appellee's motion in limine to
exclude loss of enjoyment of life damages in wrongful death case, while noting that

appellant's expert was prepared to testify to a scientific formula for evaluating
hedonic damages).
Case law citing damages for loss of enjoyment of life has a longer history.
Thirty nine states recognize loss of enjoyment of life as an element of damages. See
Moore, Loss of Enjoyment of Life, an Emerging Theory of Nonpecuniary Damages,
TRiAL, Sept. 1989, at 60. Cases citing loss of enjoyment of life damages include:
Alaska-Buoy v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 771 P.2d 439 (Alaska 1889); CaliforniaAkers v. Kelley Co., 173 Cal. App. 3d 633, 219 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1985); ConnecticutMather v. Griffin Hosp., 207 Conn. 125, 540 A.2d 666 (1988); Kiniry v. Danbury
Hosp., 183 Conn. 448, 439 A.2d 408 (1981); Florida-Tampa Elec. Co. v. Bazemore,
85 Fla. 164, 96 So. 297 (1923); Jarvinen v. HCA Allied Clinical Labs., Inc., 552 So.
2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Hawaii-Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45
Haw. 373, 369 P.2d 96 (1962); Idaho-Sanchez v. Galey, 115 Idaho 1064, 772 P.2d
702 (1989); Iowa-DeBurkart v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986) (Wolle, J.,
concurring); Kansas-Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d 823 (1989); Louis-

1990:5431

HEDONIC DAMAGES

lated the relationship between hedonic damages and more traditional
tort damages. Some courts have viewed hedonic damages as a component of pain and suffering or mental anguish 7 while others have
considered hedonic damages a part of physical disability or permanent
injury.' As such, these courts have held hedonic damages to be
duplicative and barred recovery. 9 In other jurisdictions, courts have
iana-Andrews v. Mosley Well Serv., 514 So.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1987); Maine-Diamond
Int'l Corp. v. Sullivan and Merritt, Inc., 493 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1985); MarylandMcAlister v. Carl, 233 Md. 446, 197 A.2d 140 (1964); Massachusetts-McGreevey v.
Boston Elevated Ry., 232 Mass. 347, 122 N.E. 278 (1919); Glicklich v. Spievack, 16
Mass. App. Ct. 488, 452 N.E.2d 287, 291 n.3 (1983); Michigan-Berger v. Weber,
411 Mich. 1, 303 N.W.2d 424 (1981) (Levin, J. dissenting); Minnesota-Leonard v.
Parrish, 420 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Missouri-Carthen v. Jewish Hosp.
of St. Louis, 694 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Montana-Walls v. Rue, 233
Mont. 236, 759 P.2d 169 (1988); Nebraska-Swiler v. Baker's Super Mkt., Inc., 203
Neb. 183, 277 N.W.2d 697 (1979); New Jersey-Haeussler v. Consolidated Stone and
Sand Co., 3 N.J. Misc. 159, 127 A. 602 (1925); New Mexico-Collins v. Perrine,
108 N.M. 714, 778 P.2d 912 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); New York-McDougald v.
Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1989); North CarolinaRucker v. High Point Memorial Hosp., Inc., 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974);
North Dakota-First Trust Co. of N.D. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports Shop, Inc.,
429 N.W.2d 5 (N.D. 1988); Ohio-Binns v. Fredendall, 32 Ohio St. 3d 244, 513
N.E.2d 278 (1987); Pennsylvania-Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085
(1985); Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 482 Pa. 441, 393 A.2d 1188
(1978); South Carolina-Stroud v. Stroud, 299 S.C. 394, 385 S.E.2d 205 (1989);
South Dakota-Klug v. Keller Indus., Inc., 328 N.W.2d 847 (S.D. 1982); TexasPeek v. Equipment Serv. Co., 779 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1989); Washington-Kirk v.
Washington State Univ., 109 Wash. 2d 448, 746 P.2d 285 (1987); West VirginiaFlannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1982); Wisconsin-Mack v. Mack,
108 Wis. 2d 604, 323 N.W.2d 153 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982); Wyoming-Hashimoto v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158 (Wyo. 1989); Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d
6 (Wyo. 1980).
See also Hermes, Loss of Enjoyment of Life-Duplication of Damages Versus
Full Compensation, 63 N.D.L. REv. 561, 565 (1987) and Annotation, Loss of
Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element or Factor in A warding Damagesfor Bodily
Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4th 293 (1984) for a review of the case law on loss of enjoyment
of life.
7. Funston v. United States, 513 F. Supp. 1000, 1010 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (noting
that pain and suffering includes humiliation, depression, and loss of enjoyment of
life); Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985) (including loss of
enjoyment of life in future pain and suffering).
8. Blodgett v. Olympic Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 32 Wash. App. 116, 124-25, 646
P.2d 139, 145 (1982) (agreeing with defendants that loss of enjoyment of life is
duplicative of physical and mental disability).
9. See, e.g., Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985) (noting
that it would be duplicative to allow an award for loss of enjoyment of life in
addition to pain and suffering).
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held hedonic damages to be a separately cognizable type of harm
deserving an independent remedy.' 0 No clear consensus has emerged
concerning the use of hedonic damages as a tort remedy.
Several factors have contributed to the confusion surrounding
hedonic damages. Hedonic damages are referred to in the case law

and commentary by a variety of names, making uniformity elusive;

they have been equated with damages for loss of enjoyment of life,
the value of life, loss of the pleasure of life, and loss of life." In
addition, plaintiffs have sought compensation for hedonic loss under
differing common law and statutory schemes, each with its own
guidelines and limitations and with disparate results. 2 Damages for

loss of enjoyment of life have gradually evolved over time and, like

tort damages as a whole, tend to defy neat categorization. The form
hedonic damages ultimately will take is still uncertain. 3
This comment provides an overview of hedonic damages by
reviewing how they have been measured, when they have been awarded,
and what objections have been raised to their recovery. This comment
concludes that hedonic damages may, for the most part, be adequately
represented within categories of damages currently recognized. He10. See Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Il. 1985) (separately awarding
hedonic damages in an action for wrongful death under Section 1983), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988); Bass v. Wallenstein, 769
F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting damages for loss of life, conscious pain and
suffering, and punitive damages are recoverable in Section 1983 actions); Kirk v.
Washington State Univ., 109 Wash. 2d 448, 460-62, 746 P.2d 285, 292-93 (1987)
(loss of enjoyment of life damages not duplicative of pain and suffering or disability);
Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980) (separately awarding damages of
$25,000 for loss of enjoyment of life).
11. For the purposes of this article, the terms will be used interchangeably.
12. Hedonic damages (or damages for loss of enjoyment of life) have been
primarily sought through wrongful death and survival statutes, through the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 (1982), through the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and through traditional personal injury actions in tort.
However, other statutes also permit recovery of hedonic loss. See, e.g., Matthews v.
CTI Container Transport Int'l Inc., 871 F.2d 270, 274 (2d Cir. 1989) (plaintiff was
entitled to hedonic damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28
U.S.C. § 1441(d), and was awarded $600,000 for past and future pain and suffering
and loss of enjoyment of life).
13. Walter Cannon, attorney with Rawlings, Olson & Cannon of Las Vegas,
predicts "it's going to take at least six or seven years for this theory to be decided....
[Ulltimately, it's going to go before the Supreme Court." Tapp, Lawyers Pushing
for an Expansion of 'Hedonic' Damages, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Aug. 26, 1988, at 14,
col. 1-2. Cannon represented one of the parties in Bluestein v. Groover, No. CV-LV
80-399 RDS, a federal civil rights case where testimony was given on hedonic damages.
Id. at 14, col. 1.
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donic damages are a form of general damages closely related to
disability or pain and suffering in personal injury claims; they may
be effectively argued to the jury as a subcomponent of disability or
pain and suffering, and no separate jury instruction need be given.
However, contrary to current practice in most jurisdictions, this
comment will suggest that limited general damages should be given
for hedonic loss to victims who have been rendered comatose or
suffered wrongful death.
II.

MEASUREMENT

Though hedonic damages cannot be measured with precision,
economists and attorneys do have methods to approximate the value
of hedonic loss in personal injury and wrongful death claims. Because
these methods are little understood and often a source of controversy,
the various methods used merit explanation.
Measuring intangibles such as loss of enjoyment of life has
traditionally been a function of the jury. 4 The amount of damages
for loss of enjoyment or loss of life has been suggested by attorneys,
sometimes by persuasive argument and sometimes with economic
expert testimony, but the amount of damages has been decided by
juries. 5 However, precisely how juries have made their decisions is
unclear, because the sanctity of the jury room has shielded jury
deliberations from scrutiny. Nonetheless, courts have given great
deference to jury awards, and damage awards for loss of enjoyment
of life have not been overturned unless they are so' 6grossly disproportionate to the harm as to "shock the conscience.'
Economists first attempted to measure the value of life as a value
of production through the human capital (HG) approach. 17 This
method grew out of insurance industry estimates for life insurance
14. Cf. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 577-78 (lst Cir. 1989)
(citing Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 215 (1st Cir. 1987)) ("Translating legal
damage into money damages-especially in cases which involve few significant items
of measurable economic loss-is a matter peculiarly within the jury's ken.").
15. See Glennie, Economists Can Assist With Proof, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 5, 1988

(Litigation), at 15, col. 1.
16. Cf. Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 341, 347, 778 P.2d 823, 835-36, 839
(1989) (Separate jury instruction on "loss of enjoyment of life was harmless error ....
...[TIhe jury verdict does not shock the court's conscience.").
17. Staller, Placing a Value on the Enjoyment of Life, FOR THE DEFENSE, June
1989, at 8; cf. Miller, Willingness to Pay Comes of Age: Will the System Survive?,
83 Nw. U.L. REv. 876-78 (1989) (citing A. SMiTH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 38-39
(E. Canaan ed. 1937) (1st ed. 1776)).
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needs and measures the present value of future lifetime earnings and
consumption." Using this method, damages for loss of life have
generally been limited to the victim's lost earnings minus his living
expenses, plus his medical expenses and pain and suffering.' 9 However,

limiting recovery for the value of life to one's income stream produces

anomalous results-a sizeable recovery for the younger working person, but little or no recovery for children, the elderly, or homemak-

ers. 20 Further, the HC approach, though appealing because of its
relative certainty, provides only a lower boundary on the value of
life, 2' because a person's earning capacity only reflects one aspect of
22
the total value of his or her life.
In more recent years, economists have begun developing models
to measure the value of life in addition to an individual's income
stream. 23 Measuring intangible losses-like hedonic damages-cannot
be done precisely, but economists are attempting to place a pecuniary

value on the intangible damages resulting from wrongful death and
personal injury. 24
18. Smith, The Hedonic Value of Life: Economic Expert Witness Testimony
in Injury and Wrongful Death, EXPERT EVIDENCE REP., Sept. 1989, at 3.
19. RicHAu A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 182 (3rd ed. 1986).
20. Other theories have measured the value of life-sometimes for profit,
sometimes for fun. An insurance group once valued a housewife at $1.4 million "to
show that she needed life insurance." An anatomist at Yale estimated a live person,
counting hormones and DNA, was worth $6 million. In contrast, "a University of
Illinois ...

professor[] calculated ...

the chemicals ...

in a cremated body were

worth $7.28." Doan, What a Life is Worth: U.S. Seeks a Price, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Sept. 16, 1985, at 58.
21. Smith, supra note 18, at 3.
22. 13 AM.JUR.2D PROOF OF FACTS Forensic Economics-General Overview:
Death of Person in Labor Force § 17.1 (Supp. 1989) [hereinafter 13 POF2d Supp].
Economist Stanley Smith has stated that "[w]e are worth more than what we earn."
Barrett, Price of Pleasure: New Legal Theorists Attach a Dollar Value to the Joys
of Living, Wall St. J., December 12, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
23. For example, economists have measured the value of a homemaker's life
through replacement costs (the cost of hiring the work done at market prices) or
opportunity cost (the value of the opportunity of earning outside income that is lost
to the homemaker when he or she chooses to stay at home). See Darnell, Economists
Put Price on a Life, the Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1989 (Litigation), at 16, col. 4. See also
0. AMos, JR., ECONOMICS: CONCEPTS, ANALYSIS, AND APPLICATIONS 776 (1987)
(defining opportunity cost as the "highest value of goods or other benefits given up
when a good is produced or any action is taken").
24. R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW

AND

ECONOMICs 331 (1988). Pecuniary loss

includes "all loss, deprivation, or injury as can be made the subject of calculation
and of recompense in money." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (5th ed. 1979). Chicago

economist Stan V. Smith writes, "I define hedonic losses to be pecuniary losses since
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Stan V. Smith, the economist who coined the term hedonic
damages, bases his estimates for the value of life on the willingnessto-pay (WTP) approach, an economic model that measures the intangible value of life. 25 Under the WTP model, "the hedonic value of
life is estimated from the price associated with a small change in the
risk of death .

. . ."

26While acknowledging his basis in the WTP

approach, Smith does not describe his model in great detail, calling
his formula "proprietary. ' 27 An outline of Smith's formula for
hedonic damages, contained herein, can be gleaned from his articles
and interviews.28

they are measurable in monetary terms, meeting the definition in Black's Law
Dictionary." Letter from Stan V. Smith to Gretchen L. Valentine (Nov. 4, 1989).
The valuation of intangibles has been dealt with by economists in other areas.
For instance, goodwill in a business is an intangible, "defined as the difference
between what is paid for the enterprise and the book value." Everett Dillman,
Economic Damages for Wrongful Death, Valuation of Intangibles 2 (Apr. 29, 1988)
(paper presented to The Economic Section, Western Social Science Association, 30th
Annual Conference in Denver, Colorado).
25. See Smith, supra note 18, at 3. Basically, the willingness-to-pay approach
values life by measuring the amount of money individuals, businesses, or government
agencies are willing to pay to avoid or reduce the risk of injury or death to one or
more persons.
26. Id. The "controversial [WTP] approach" has been credited to "University
of Chicago economist Kip Viscusi .... ." See Doan, supra note 20, at 58. Viscusi
has noted the "implicit value of life" as identified by the following investigators:
Investigator
Blomquist (1979)
Brown (1980)
Leight
Olson
Portney (1981)
Smith (1965)
Thaler and Rose (1976)
Viscusi (1979)
Viscusi (1981)

Implicit Value of Life
$560,000
$1-1.5 million
$3.8-8.9 million
$7.4 million
$593,000-890,000
$7.5 million
$580,000
$2.9-3.9 million
$7-11 million

Dillman, supra note 24, at 6 (citing Viscusi, The Valuation of Risks to Life and
Health: Guideline for Policy Analysis, in BENEFrr ASSESSMENTS: THE STATE OF THE
ART 201 (1968)).
The WTP approach has also been credited to Thomas Schelling. See Miller,
supra note 17, at 878.
27. Miller, supra note 1, at 9. "Richard G. Halpern, rival New Jersey litigation
consultant, calls Mr. Smith's [theory] footloose and fancy free." Barrett, supra note
22, at Al, col. 1.
28. A more comprehensive review of the model must come from the economist
himself, via consultation or further elaboration in print. Stanley Smith is President
of the Corporate Financial Group, 1165 N. Clark Suite 650, Chicago, IL 60610. Mr.
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Smith asserts that economists using the WTP model have attempted to measure the value society places on life in a variety of
ways, which fall into four broad categories. These four methods of
valuing life are questionnaire data, governmental spending, private
29
spending, and income compensation data.
The first method, questionnaire data, involves studies in which
economists have asked consumers what they are willing to pay for
safety. For example, individuals have been asked how much more
they would pay to travel on airlines with higher safety records.3 0 From
this information, economists have inferred the value a person places
3
on his or her own life. 1
The second and third methods, governmental and private spending, are based on government and industry expenditures for safety. 32
Government expenditures for safety include such things as ejection
seats for Navy pilots, OSHA mandated safety requirements, and
NASA safety equipment. 33 Private spending for life-saving measures
includes money allocated for smoke detectors, ambulance services,
emergency telephone systems, and airbags in automobiles.3 4
Smith commands a hefty consulting fee for his expertise. A report fee to produce

the analysis costs $1,800 and up. His "hourly fee is from $180, [with] a $45-an-hour
deposition and trial surcharge." Miller, supra note 1, at 9. Further elaboration on
Smith's theory is forthcoming through a book Smith has co-authored on hedonic
damages, M.L. BROOKSHIm & S.V. SMrTH, EcONOMIc/HEDo~ic DAMAGES: THE
ATToRNEys (1990).
29. See Smith, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, A.B.A. J., Sept.

PRACTICE BOOK FOR PLAINTIFF AND DEFENSE

1, 1988, at 72-73.
30. See Smith, supra note 29, at 72.
31. Id.

32. The government itself has been calculating the value of life. Since February
1981, the Office of Management and Budget has ordered government agencies to do
a cost/benefit analysis on all proposed regulations that would cost an industry more
than $100 million. In complying with the order, many agencies had to place a value
on human life. For example, a regulation costing $250 million would be beneficial if
lives were valued at 5 million dollars each and at least 50 people could be saved. See
Doan, supra note 20, at 58.
33. Cf. Barrett, supra note 22, at A5, col. 4-5. For another example of
government spending to avoid the risk of death, Stanley Smith, economist, "notes
[that] the U.S. government was willing to [expend] $10 million to $15 million per
person to [free] the Iranian hostages ....

."

Tarr, Illinois Jury Awards 'Hedonic'

Damages, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 3.
34. Cf. Barrett, supra note 22, at A5, col. 3-5. John R. Glennie, a Washington,
D.C. economist, argues that people are not calculating the value of life when they
buy safety devices, such as smoke detectors. Such behavior is influenced by "whim,
advertising, peer pressure, and other social and psychological factors ....

at AS, col. 6.

"

See id.
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Finally, the fourth method involves income compensation data
taken from the labor market, measuring how much extra a worker
must be paid to accept a job with higher risk. Examples of these
high-risk occupations are coal mining and high beam welding.3 5 According to Smith, an individual's appraisal of the value of his own
life can be inferred by comparing the extra pay received with the extra
36
risk involved.
Under these four methods the range of possible values of life
shows wide variation, from just under $100,000 obtained from questionnaire data to the tens of millions implied by OSHA regulations
of coke oven emissions and acrylonitrile safety.3 7 Smith asserts that
many of the studies show values for life ranging from $500,000 to
so" which an average
$3.5 million, 38 in addition to the "1 million or '39
adult may be worth "in terms of lost income."
In applying the WTP model to measure the intrinsic value of
life, Smith makes several preliminary assumptions. First, Smith assumes that hedonic value, the value of an individual's enjoyment of
life, is unrelated to a person's earnings.4 Second, hedonic value is

35. See, Smith, supra note 29, at 73. For example, consider a risky job where
one of every 10,000 workers dies. If a worker will take the riskier job for $200 more
a year than his comparatively safer job, then the value of life to that worker is "$200
times 10,000-or 2 million dollars, according to Viscusi." See Doan, supra note 20,
at 58.
36. See Smith, supra note 29, at 73. Others argue that employment studies do
not consider that employees may be unaware of the risks, may be unable to find
safer work, and may be more predisposed to risk-taking than the average person.
See Barrett, supra note 22, at A5, col. 6 (citing John R. Glennie, Washington, D.C.
economist).
37. See 13 POF2d Supp, supra note 22, § 158. A chart prepared by Stanley V.
Smith to show the range of implied values for a human life provided, in part, the
following data:
Value of Life
Basis for Calculation
$66,000
Desire for prompt coronary care
360,000
Automobile air bag purchases
373,000
Smoke detector purchases
850,000
Wage premiums for dangerous police work
3,600,000
Premium tire usage
11,800,000
Desire for safer airline travel
These figures were developed by assessing what people pay for products or services
that change the risk of death. See Barrett, supra note 22, at A5, col. 4-5.
38. Economist's Testimony Crucial to $1 Million 'Hedonic' Damages Award,
INsiDE LITIGATION, June 1989, at 4 [hereinafter Economist's Testimony].
39. See Barrett, supra note 22, at Al, col. 1.
40. See Smith, supra note 29, at 71.
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independent of social rank, gender, family position, and wealth.

Third, the hedonic value of life is related to life expectancy, so that
a teenager has greater potential hedonic value than a retiree. And
fourth, Smith assumes that "the hedonic value of life of each future
' 41
year has a zero real discount rate."

Considering the data collected on reducing the risk of death in
light of these assumptions, Smith has arrived at an average estimate
of the value of life. Smith used this average value to estimate hedonic
loss in the recent case, Ferguson v. Vest. 42 In Ferguson, Smith testified
that a conservative value for the plaintiff's life was $2.7 million,
based on public and private sector studies of the cost for increased

safety.43 Smith stated that for the statistically average person the value

of life is approximately $63,000 per year."
To estimate Mrs. Ferguson's hedonic loss, Smith utilized a psychological study prepared by Daniel Cuneo, Chief of Psychology for
the Illinois Department of Corrections. 45 Dr. Cuneo estimated Eva
Ferguson's lost pleasure of life by using The Lost Pleasure of Life
Scale in Injury Cases (LPL Scale), a scale developed by Smith.4 The
LPL Scale is very similar to a scale in the APA's diagnostic manual
of mental disorders which assesses psychosocial stressors. 47 Utilizing
the LPL Scale, Cuneo assessed Ferguson's disability-physically, emo41. Id. Smith states, "[Wihile we typically discount future dollars by a present
value factor, so that a dollar expected next year might be worth ...95 cents to us
today, we assume ...

the hedonic value of life ... has a zero real discount rate."

Id. Smith gives two reasons for this assumption.
First, the monthly returns to U.S. Treasury Bills from 1926 to the present
have been almost indistinguishable from inflation: the real rate of interest
is almost precisely zero. Second, economists assert that every asset has broad
substitutability[,] . . . [b]ut a 25-year-old cannot give away or sell or
substitute the pleasure of living his 27th year .... We must take our years,

Id.

one by one ....

42. No. 87-L-207 (3d Judicial Cir., Madison Cty., Ill., Mar. 17, 1989). See
also infra note 83 for details of the plaintiff's personal injury claim.
43. See Economist's Testimony, supra note 38, at 5.
44. Id.
45. Hedonic Damages of $1 Million Awarded Under Assumed Name, [Current

Reports Transfer Binder] 5 Crvn. TR1A MANUAL (BNA) 214 (May 31, 1989).
46. S.Smith, The Lost Pleasure of Life Scale in Injury Cases (from Corporate
Financial Group, Ltd., 1165 N. Clark Street, Suite 650, Chicago, IL 60610) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter LPL Scale]. See also Berla, Brookshire & Smith,
Hedonic Damages and Personal Injury: A Conceptual Approach, 3 J. OF FoRENsIc
ECON. 1 (1990) for a recent review of the Lost Pleasure of Life (LPL) Scale.
47. Id. at 3 (citing the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III (revised)).
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tionally, and socially-at between 66 per cent and 83 per cent.4

Applying the results of Dr. Cuneo's report to his own estimate
of the hedonic value of Eva Ferguson's life, Smith estimated that
Ferguson's hedonic value was reduced by about $50,000 per year.
Projecting that she had a life expectancy of 20 years, based upon the
Life Tables published by the U.S. Department of Health, Bureau of
Vital Statistics, 49 Smith estimated that Ferguson had suffered past and
future losses of $1,019,272.0
Other economists have examined Smith's willingness-to-pay based
estimates of the value of human life and concluded that the underlying

51
premise is flawed. Jerome Staller, a Philadelphia economist, has

48. See Lines of Attack,

INSIDE LITIGATION,

June 1989, at 19.

The LPL Scale measures the reduction in the pleasure of life resulting from
injury by assessing four areas: occupation, practical functioning, emotional, and
social functioning. The occupational rating measures the impact on activities from
which a person gains meaning, pleasure, and a sense of self esteem-apart from any
economic gain from the occupation. Practical functioning covers a person's daily
living activities, for 'example grooming, dressing, eating, and household tasks. The
emotional rating looks at the type and severity of emotional reactions, such as anxiety
and depression. And social functioning assesses the level of interference with leisure
activities, for example reading, sports, hobbies, dancing, or traveling. After assessing
the individual's diminished capacity to enjoy life in each of these areas, a summary
evaluation combining the impact of all four areas is made. LPL Scale, supra note
46, at 1-2.
The LPL Scale measures the injury's degree of impact on the lost pleasure of
life ranging from none to minimal, mild, moderate, severe, extreme, and catastrophic.
Id. at Table 1. The evaluator is instructed to assess an individual's estimated lost
quality of life through his expected life span, considering that the injury's impact
over time will vary according to the individual's age and the type of harm incurred.
Id. at 3. For example, a 22 year old, struck by a hit and run driver, may sustain
multiple fractures, require multiple surgeries and hospitalizations to correct her
injuries, and suffer catastrophic hedonic losses during the first year. Within three
years, she may be largely recovered, with minimal physical limitations and limited
emotional impairment. At this point ter hedonic loss may be mild. However, as she
ages, she may be more prone to medical problems as a result of her injuries (i.e.
arthritis) and suffer increased loss of enjoyment of life, causing her hedonic loss to
rise to moderate or severe. See id. at Example - Psychological Assessment of LPL
Ratings of Karen Doe.
49. Lines of Attack, INsIDE LrrIGATxION, June 1989, at 17.
50. Id. at 20. Excerpts from the trial testimony of Stanley Smith in Ferguson
v. Vest provide a more detailed analysis of how the estimates of hedonic damages
were prepared and presented to the jury. See id. at 15-20. Smith's economic damage
study encompassed past and future losses of two types, hedonic loss and loss of
household services. See Economist's Testimony, supra note 38, at 5.
51. "Jerome Staller, Ph.D., is the president of the Center for Forensic Economic Studies, a Philadelphia-based firm that provides economic and statistical
analysis in legal matters." Staller, supra note 17, at 10 (editorial comment).
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asserted that the WTP studies were intended as cost-benefit analyses
to guide decision makers in public safety programs and do not measure
the enjoyment of life.12 He proposes that a more precise method for
valuing life's enjoyment might be found by looking at how much time
an individual spends in leisure or in pleasurable activities. 3
Staller suggests that time spent in pleasurable activities could be
valued on a per-hour basis, using the minimum wage or average
hourly earnings as the benchmark.5 4 He cites a 1975-76 study conducted at the University of Michigan, which measures the amount of
time Americans spend in leisure activities," and postulates that this
study could help to provide an objective lower boundary for the
hedonic value of life.5 6 Hedonic value could be estimated by multiplying the amount of time spent in pleasurable activities by an individual's
average hourly wage.
Staller acknowledges that measuring the value of time spent in
leisure activities provides only a minimal estimate of one's total
hedonic value.5 7 "It does not account for the pleasure... [of] seeing
one's children mature, attaining various goals in life or seeing the sun
rise." 8 However, Staller finds the per-hour approach to hedonic value
advantageous, because it is easily measured and based on information
a jury can understand. 9 In addition, "[ailmost any logical per-hour
value yields a measure of hedonic damages significantly lower than
that arrived at via the willingness-to-pay model."6
No single method for measuring hedonic loss is universally accepted. Attorneys will continue to argue damages to juries, and
economists will continue to develop and expand their differing methods of measuring hedonic loss. The human capital approach, the
willingness-to-pay model, and per-hour valuations are three methods
that provide dissimilar values for loss of enjoyment of life. Though
economists differ in their methodology, most agree that any effort to
translate intangible human losses into money damages cannot be done
52. See Staller, supra note 17, at 8.
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. at 10.
55. Id. at 9 (citing study conducted by Frank Stafford and Greg J. Duncan,
Survey Research Center for Social Research, University of Michigan).
56. Staller, Hedonic Damages:How to Assess 'Life's Pleasures',Pa. L.J. Rep.,
Jan. 7, 1985, at 11, col. 1.

57. See id. at col. 2.
58. Id.
59. Id.

60. See Staller, supra note 17, at 10.
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but
with precision. 6' Economists and attorneys can provide guidelines,
6
1
jury.
the
of
discretion
the
within
ultimately the decision rests
III.

CASES ADDRESSING HEDONIC DAMAGES

Cases addressing hedonic damages illustrate prior efforts to identify and measure hedonic loss. Case law pertaining to hedonic loss
can be roughly divided into two categories, personal injury and
wrongful death, each with its own case precedents and statutes.
A.

PERSONAL INJURY

In personal injury cases, damages for loss of enjoyment of life
have long been awarded. 63 However, the more recent term hedonic
damages has only been mentioned in two personal injury cases to
date, Ferguson v. Vest,6 and Leiker v. Gafford.65
Ferguson and Leiker illustrate a primary issue in personal injury
actions to recover hedonic loss-separate jury instruction. Some courts
66
have permitted separate jury instruction on loss of enjoyment of life,
but more commonly, and most appropriately, damages for loss of
67
enjoyment of life have been included within other categories of loss.
Outlining the relationship between hedonic damages and other damages for personal injury provides a framework for understanding this
issue.
Compensatory damages are usually awarded in personal injury
claims. 68 Compensatory damages are generally given to restore a
61. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 29, at 72 (noting that the economist presents
"a probable range for the value of life, but only the jury can decide where on that
range any given individual falls.").
62. See Smith, supra note 29, at 72.
63. See, e.g., Haeussler v. Consolidated Stone & Sand Co., 3 N.J. Misc. 159,
127 A. 602 (1925); McGreevey v. Boston Elevated Ry., 232 Mass. 347, 122 N.E. 278
(1919); see also supra note 6 for related discussion.
64. No. 87-L-207 (3d Judicial Cir., Madison Cty., Ill., Mar. 17, 1989).
65. 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d 823 (1989).
66. See, e.g., Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980) (separately awarding
damages of $25,000 for loss of enjoyment of life); Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d
1173, 1190 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting damages for loss of life, conscious pain and
suffering, and punitive damages are recoverable in Section 1983 actions); Sherrod v.
Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (awarding hedonic damages in an action for
wrongful death under Section 1983), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 856 F.2d
802 (7th Cir. 1988).
67. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 577-80 (lst Cir.
1989); Yosuf v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 432, 439 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
.68. With the exception of intentional torts involving particularly reprehensible
conduct, punitive damages are not ordinarily recoverable in Illinois personal injury
claims. B. CROWE, P. FULLER, & L. RING, ILLINOIS PRACTICE GUIDE: PERSONAL
INJURY, para. 3:32 (1989) [hereinafter ILL. PRAc. GDE.].
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person to his or her pre-injury condition or to reimburse that person
for loss, 69 but may also be used to deter wrongful conduct and

unlawful self-help.70
In personal injury claims, as elsewhere, these compensatory damages are of two types: special (economic damages) and general (noneconomic damages or intangibles). 7' Special damages must be specifically pled and proved by the evidence 72 and cover medical expenses, 73
loss of earnings, 74 and impaired earning capacity. 7 1 In contrast, general
damages may be awarded without proof of pecuniary loss7 6 and cover
intangible forms of harm such as pain and suffering, 77 disability and
69. Id. at para. 3:4 (citing Goldberg v. Ruskin, 113 IIl. 2d 482, 499 N.E.2d
406 (1986)).
70. See Comment, Hedonic Damages in Section 1983 Actions: A Remedy for
the UnconstitutionalDeprivation of Life, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 321, 339 (1987)
[hereinafter Comment, Hedonic Damages] (noting that in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 256-57 (1978), the Supreme Court recognized "that deterrence is inherent in
substantial compensatory" damage awards).
71. ILL. PRAc. GDE., supra note 68, at paras. 3:5 and 3:6. This accords with
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 904, comments b and c (1977) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]. In Illinois, special damages are known as direct, tangible, or economic
damages, whereas general damages are referred to as nonpecuniary, intangible, or
noneconomic damages. ILL. PRAC. GDE., supra note 68, at paras. 3:5, 3:6. Both

general and special compensatory damages are recoverable for past, present, and
future harm resulting from an injury. See, e.g., McDaniels v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n.,
302 Ill. App. 332, 350, 23 N.E.2d 785, 792-93 (4th Dist. 1939) (discussing future
medical expenses and lost earnings as compensable injuries).
72. ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEcAL EDUCATION, Proof of Damages
§ 1.2 (1987) [hereinafter IICLE].
73. ILL. PRAC. GDE., supra note 68, at para. 3:50 (citing Department of Law
Enforcement v. Willis, 61 II. App. 3d 495, 378 N.E.2d 239 (1978) and ILLINOIS
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONs-CrvIL 30.06 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter IPI2d-CIv.]).
74. ILL. PRAC. GDE., supra note 68, at para. 3:88 (citing Steele v. Brown, 43

Ill. App. 2d 293, 193 N.E.2d 352 (1963) (which held that a claimant may recover for

value of lost working time)).
75. ILL. PRAC. GDE., supra note 68, at para. 3:148 (citing Buckler v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 68 Ill. App. 2d 283, 216 N.E.2d 14 (1966) (noting awards for impaired
earning capacity compensate for injury to the plaintiff's earning power and include
"the extent ... the injury has interfered with plaintiff's ability to advance to a better
paying position .... ")).
76. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON TORTS 9 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. PROSSER
& R. KEETON]. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 71, at § 905; ILL. PRAc. GDE.,

supra note 68, at para. 3:31 (citing to Kimes v. Trapp, 52 Il. App. 2d 442, 202
N.E.2d 42 (1964)).
77. ILL. PRAC. GDE., supra note 68, at paras. 3:165, 3:166 (citing Haizen v.
Yellow Cab Co., 41 111. App. 2d 330, 190 N.E.2d 514 (1963) for the proposition that
plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for all physical pain suffered).
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disfigurement, 7 shortened life expectancy, 79 and loss of enjoyment of

life. 0 Thus, hedonic damages (or damages for loss, of enjoyment of
life) are one type of general compensatory damages recoverable in
tort.
Plaintiffs and defendants frequently disagree over whether a
separate jury instruction should be given on these hedonic damages.
Plaintiffs seek separate instruction so the damages will more accurately
reflect the nature of their loss; defendants fear that a separately
itemized category of damages will increase the total damage award.
However, the critical issue is not whether a separate jury instruction
should be given, but whether the plaintiff should be allowed to argue
his or her hedonic damages to the jury. Once testimony has been
given on hedonic loss, an adequately persuaded jury is likely to award
hedonic damages by increasing the amount of damages within a preexisting general damages category. Ferguson v. Vest"' illustrates this
concept.
Ferguson is the first case in Illinois to have awarded hedonic
damages after economic expert testimony was given on hedonic loss
in a personal injury claim.8 2 In Ferguson the court awarded the retired
plaintiff a total of $2,332,000 for injuries received during radiation
treatments. 3 Of the total amount, $1,082,000 was awarded for past
78. Id. at paras. 3:210, 3:221 (citing Horan v. Klein's-Sheridan, Inc., 62 Ill.
App. 2d 455, 211 N.E.2d 116 (1965)). See also IPI2D-CIv., supra note 73, at 30.04.
79. ILL. PiAc. GDE., supra note 68, at para. 3:225.
80. Id. at para. 3:212. For examples of inability to "enjoy life," see id. at
paras. 3:213-3:219. See also Wood v. Mobil Chemical Co., 50 Ill. App. 3d 465, 365
N.E.2d 1087 (1977).
81. No. 87-L-207 (3d Judicial Cir., Madison Cty., Ill., Mar. 17, 1989).
82. Ferguson does not constitute binding precedent in Illinois, because as a
trial court case it is an unreported decision. The defendants have settled for an
amount reported to be near $2 million. Marcotte, Lost Pleasure Suit, A.B.A. J.,
April 1990, at 30.
83. Id. Ferguson's medical malpractice claim was filed after she suffered
permanent and disabling injuries from radiation treatments for a purported case of
cervical cancer. After a pap smear came back positive for cervical cancer, Ferguson's
gynecologist ordered radiation treatments. The radiologist, Dr. Bruce Vest, ordered
another pap smear and two biopsies, all showing the absence of cancer. In spite of
the negative test results, Ferguson was given 12 radiation treatments. Ferguson's
medical malpractice claim alleged the radiation treatments were unnecessary.
Severe injuries from the radiation resulted in constant vaginal discharge and
diarrhea, requiring Ferguson to undergo a colectomy and the removal of her vagina.
Her bladder shrank. Scar tissue formed in her urethra, which closes unless she visits
her urologist monthly to have it dilated. Radiation treatments restricted Ferguson's
formerly active life and reduced the number of activities in which she could engage.
Hedonic Damages of $1 Million Awarded Under Assumed Name, [Current Reports
Transfer Binder] 5 Crvm TRL. MAuAL. (BNA) 213 (May, 1989).
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and future disability and disfigurement, which included hedonic dam-

ages. 84 Though the jury did not itemize the value of hedonic damages,
the court permitted extensive expert testimony on the hedonic loss

suffered by the plaintiff because of the limitations placed on her life.85
Because the jury awarded disability damages slightly over the expert's

estimate of hedonic loss, it can be reasonably assumed that the jury
included hedonic damages in its disability award. 86 Thus, arguing
hedonic damages within the categories of past and future disability
does not foreclose the possibility of compensation for hedonic loss.
In Leiker v. Gafford, 7 a recent decision from the Supreme Court

of Kansas, the court let stand a separately itemized damage award
for loss of enjoyment of life, noting that these damages are "sometimes referred to as hedonic." 8 8 In Leiker, a semi-comatose patient

filed suit through her husband for injuries she sustained from an

84. Ferguson v. Vest, No. 87-L-207, (3d Judicial Cir., Madison Cty., Ill., Mar.
17, 1989).
Damages awarded by the jury included:
For past disability and disfigurement $200,000
For future disability and disfigurement 882,000
For past pain and suffering 250,000
For future pain and suffering 750,000
For past medical expenses 50,000
For future medical expenses 200,000
Total $2,332,000
Id.
85. Mr. Merle C. Bassett, attorney for Mrs. Ferguson, wrote,
In regard to the jury verdict form, you will note that there is a complete
absence of the word 'hedonic.' We put the testimony under the disability
and disfigurement to be experienced in the past and disability and disfigurement to be experienced in the future. The Trial Judge, Honorable Nicholas
Byron, had indicated to us that he would allow us to insert a category
entitled hedonic damage in the jury instruction and in the verdict form if
we so desired. However, as part of our trial strategy, we preferred to do it
this way since nothing in the law of Illinois has encompassed this particular
problem.
Letter from Merle C. Bassett to Gretchen L. Valentine (Nov. 8, 1989) (discussing
decision to omit the term 'hedonic'). Mr. Merle Bassett, attorney for the plaintiff in
Ferguson v. Vest, No. 87-L-207 (3d Judicial Cir., Madison Cty., Ill., Mar. 17, 1989),
stated that without the economist's testimony on hedonic loss, the damages awarded
for disability would have been lower. Telephone conversation with Merle Bassett
(Nov. 1, 1989).
86. See, e.g., Schmidt, The Right to Recover for Hedonic Damages: A New
Issue in Illinois, 25 Tort Trends 1, ISBA Tort L. Sec. Newsl. (August 1989).
87. 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d 823 (1989).
88. Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 339, 778 P.2d 823, 834 (1989).
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overdose of anesthesia given during childbirth.

9

The court rejected

loss of enjoyment of life as a separate category of nonpecuniary

damages, finding them compensable as an element of pain and
suffering and/or disability. 9° However, considering Shawn Leiker's
severe injury and the modest award for her loss, the court held that
the separate jury instruction on hedonic loss was harmless error and
did not justify reversal. 91
In older cases, courts have considered whether separate jury

instruction should be given for damages for loss of enjoyment of life.

In Mariner v. Marsden,92 the court held that damages for loss of
enjoyment of life could be given a separate jury instruction or
considered within the total general damages. 93 The plaintiff was
separately awarded $25,000 for loss of enjoyment of life following

injury from an automobile collision, which the Supreme Court of

Wyoming affirmed on appeal, holding loss of enjoyment of life
compensable. 94
Apart from common law claims, the issue of separate jury
instruction is implicit where plaintiffs have sought hedonic damages
under a variety of statutes. In federal courts, the Federal Tort Claims
89. See Leiker, 245 Kan. at 330-32, 778 P.2d at 829-30. Shawn Leiker went
into labor on January 28, 1982. A baby girl was successfully delivered by Cesarean
section. Following delivery, the mother lapsed into a coma. She never regained
consciousness and died almost six years later. Id.
90. Id. 340, 778 P.2d at 835.
91. Id. at 341, 778 P.2d at 835-36. The Kansas Court held that separately
itemized damages of $150,000 for loss of enjoyment of life were not excessive, since
"Shawn Leiker remained in a semi-comatose condition for nearly six years and was
totally deprived of all aspects of normal living the entire time." Id.
92. 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980).
93. Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6 (Wyo. 1980). The trial judge awarded and
the Supreme Court affirmed the following measures of damages:
medical expenses, lost wages and damage to personal property ....... $ 3,000
past pain and suffering ............................................................. 19,500
future pain and suffering ........................................................... 5,000
loss of enjoyment of life .......................................................... 25,000
Id. at 7.
94. Id. at 12. The court noted that of the ten cases appellant cited to support
the proposition that hedonic loss is not separately compensable, all but two of them
were decided "within ten years of the turn of the century." Id. at 12-13, n.3.
Typically, those cases rejecting loss of enjoyment of life damages for personal
injury are older cases. See Hermes, Loss of Enjoyment of Life-Duplication of
Damages Versus Full Compensation, 63 N.D.L. REv. 561, 565-68 (1987) (citing
Hogan v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938); Locke v.
Int'l & Great N. Railway, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 145, 148, 60 S.W. 314, 316 (1901); City
of Columbus v. Strassner, 124 Ind. 482, 489, 25 N.E. 65, 67 (1890)).
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Act (FTCA) 5 and Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act (Section 1983) 96
are two statutes under which personal injury claimants have sought
97
and received damages for hedonic loss.
In Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena,a" a personal injury action
brought under Section 1983, damages for loss of enjoyment of life
were affirmed as part of the general compensatory damage award."
No separate jury instruction was given. The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the plaintiff's damage award for
injuries resulting from a negligently inflicted gunshot wound which
left the plaintiff a paraplegic.'00 The court noted that the detailed
testimony of the plaintiff and his mother adequately supported the
damage award, which compensated the young man for his "terrible
and constant pain, permanent disability and . . . loss of enjoyment
of life."''
In Yosuf v. United States,0 2 the court awarded $50,000 damages
for disfigurement, pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life. A
prison inmate fell and injured his wrist and hand, received negligent
medical care, and filed suit under the FTCA. The court awarded
95. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 (1986). The Federal Tort Claims Act permits tort
claims against the federal government, while preserving government immunity for
certain intentional torts and actions within the discretion of a federal employee.
96. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1986). Section 1983 actions arise when state officers
violate a person's constitutional or federally created right while acting under the
authority of state law.
97. See Yosuf v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 432 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (plaintiff
brought suit under the FTCA and was awarded $50,000 for pain, suffering, disfigurement and loss of enjoyment of life); see also Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena,
882 F.2d 553, 580 (1st Cir. 1989) (plaintiff brought suit under Section 1983 and was
awarded compensatory damages which included damages for loss of enjoyment of
life).
98. 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989).
99. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 582 (1st Cir. 1989).
100. Gutierrez, 22 years old, was on a date with his girlfriend. A squad of police
officers left their unmarked vehicle and approached Gutierrez' parked car in plain
clothes with guns drawn. Without warning, they shot Gutierrez when he began to
drive away, leaving Gutierrez permanently paralyzed from the waist down. Id. at
557. Recovery wis permitted under Section 1983 for deprivation of his constitutional
right to liberty without due process of law. Id.
101. The District Court's award of $4.5 million in compensatory damages did
not "shock the conscience" considering the extent of his loss. Id. at 580. An additional
$600,000 in punitive damages was upheld, since "a jury may ...assess punitive
damages in an action under Section 1983 when the defendant's conduct ... involves
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Id. at
581.

102. 642 F. Supp. 432 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
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damages for loss of enjoyment of life as part of a category compensating other intangible losses. 10 3 The plaintiff was compensated for
hedonic loss because of his present and future inability to participate
in religious activities, sports, and hobbies that he formerly enjoyed. °4
Whether a plaintiff brings suit under the common law or under
statute, courts seem more concerned with providing some recovery
for hedonic loss than with how it is accomplished. Hedonic damages
can be awarded via separate jury instruction and a separately itemized
category of damages if courts so provide. However, lack of jury
instruction does not preclude recovery. Juries have also awarded
hedonic damages within pre-existing general damages categories, where
courts have permitted testimony on hedonic loss.
B.

WRONGFUL DEATH

Damages for wrongful death are sought entirely under statute,
because there is no common law action for wrongful death. 05 State
wrongful death and survival statutes permit a decedent's cause of
action to survive his or her demise; similarly, the Federal Tort Claims
Act 1°6 permits a cause of action for wrongful death formerly barred
by sovereign immunity to be brought against the government. Other
statutes such as Section 1983107 have created a new cause of action
for wrongful death.
In wrongful death cases, damages for loss of enjoyment of life
have been awarded primarily in federal Section 1983 claims. Under
1983, individuals are protected against state deprivations of a constitutional or federally-created right. Wrongful death claims brought
pursuant to this statute seek damages for violations of the fourteenth
amendment guarantee that no one shall be deprived of life without
due process of law. 08
103. Yosuf v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 432, 438 (M.D. Pa. 1986).
104. Id. at 439 (citing Downie v. United States Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 897 (1966)). The plaintiff was Islamic. The injury he
suffered has limited his participation in Islamic customs, such as group prayer and
eating out of common bowls. The plaintiff is limited in his ability to engage in
activities which he formerly enjoyed such as tennis, weightlifting, and home remodeling. Even after undergoing recommended surgery he will have some degree of pain
and numbness. Id. at 439.
105. Hall v. Gillins, 13 Ill. 2d 26, 147 N.E.2d 352 (1958) (surviving spouse and
children have no common law right of action for wrongful death).
106. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 (1982).
107. 28 U.S.C § 1983 (1982).
108. See, e.g., Bass v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. lO

However, there is limited precedent citing the term hedonic
damages in Section 1983 wrongful death claims. The term hedonic
was not coined until 1979 in Sherrod v. Berry,'°9 a Section 1983 case
arising out of a.fatal shooting. In Sherrod, the jury awarded $850,000

in hedonic damages and $300,000 in pecuniary damages to Ron
Sherrod's estate following his father's suit for wrongful death." 0
Though the Seventh Circuit ultimately reversed and remanded on
other grounds, the portion of the vacated opinion referring to hedonic
damages was not overruled."' The parties settled for $450,000 follow-

ing remand without specifying the amount awarded for hedonic
damages. "1

2

In awarding hedonic damages in Sherrod v. Berry, the Seventh
Circuit relied on two prior cases permitting recovery for loss of life
in Section 1983 actions-Bell v. City of Milwaukee"3 and Bass v.
Wallenstein."14 In these early cases, damages for the decedents' loss
109. 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (awarding hedonic damages in an action
for wrongful death under Section 1983), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 856
F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
110. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 160 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Lucien Sherrod
filed suit after his 19-year-old son Ron was wrongfully shot and killed by Willie
Berry, a Joliet policeman. Ron Sherrod, a mechanic on duty, agreed to help Gary
Duckworth and left in Ron's car. Unknown to Ron, Duckworth had committed a
robbery moments before.
Joliet policeman Willie Berry spotted Duckworth in Sherrod's car. Suspecting
Duckworth of the robbery, Berry signaled Sherrod to stop. Berry drew his revolver
and approached the vehicle, shouting profanities and ordering Ron and Duckworth
to get their hands up. Both complied.
Berry held his revolver to Ron Sherrod's left temple, later testifying that he saw
Ron move his right hand toward the left pocket of his jacket. Berry fired, killing
Ron Sherrod instantly. Subsequently, it was discovered that neither Duckworth nor
Sherrod were armed, and that Ron was likely reaching for his driver's license. Id. at
160-62.
111. Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 807-08 (7th Cir. 1988). On remand the
court of appeals did not reverse its prior decision of the admissibility of expert
testimony on hedonic damages. The court of appeals instructed the lower court to
decide that issue in light of the 7th Circuit's earlier vacated opinion, which concluded
that the "testimony of expert economist Stanley Smith was invaluable to the jury in
enabling it to perform its function of determining ...

the damages recoverable for

the hedonic value of [Ron Sherrod's] life." Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 206 (7th
Cir. 1987). See also Smith, The Hedonic Value of Life: Economic Expert Witness
Testimony in Injury and Wrongful Death, EXPERT EVIDENCE REPORTER, September
1989, at 2.
112. Staller, Placing a Value on the Enjoyment of Life, FOR THE DEFENSE, June
1989, at 9.
113. 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984), cited in Sherrod, 827 F.2d at 205.
114. 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1984), cited in Sherrod, 827 F.2d at 205.
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of enjoyment of life were implicitly recovered within the damages
awarded for loss of life.
In Bell, the victim's siblings filed suit for damages after the fatal
shooting of their brother by city police officers." 5 The seventh circuit
noted that under the Wisconsin wrongful death statute recovery is not
permitted for loss of life, ' 6 but the court allowed Bell Section 1983
damages for loss of life despite the inhospitable Wisconsin law. The
court ruled that where restrictive state law was inconsistent with
federal civil rights law the state law must yield."' Thus, the court
permitted the plaintiff to recover for loss of life under Section 1983
8
to provide a uniform federal rule and serve a deterrent purpose."
In Bass v. Wallenstein,"'9 suit was filed on behalf of Johnny Lee
Bass after he died of cardiorespiratory arrest at Stateville Correctional
Center.' 20 This Section 1983 action claimed deprivation of Bass'
fourteenth amendment right "not to be deprived of life without due

process of law

....

",121

The federal court permitted damages for loss

of enjoyment of life under Section 1983 even though the Illinois
Wrongful Death Statute'2 denied recovery, holding the Illinois law to
be inconsistent with the deterrent policy of Section 1983.123
In Guyton v. Phillips, 4 the first Section 1983 case to award
recovery for loss of enjoyment of life, a fourteen-year-old male was
115. Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1206 (7th Cir. 1984). After the
fatal shooting, city police officers conspired to conceal the facts surrounding the
racially-motivated killing. Id.
116. Id. at 1236.
117. Id. at 1238. The court noted that the Supreme Court had yet to rule on
whether Section 1983 actions permitted recovery in spite of restrictive state law. But
the court analogized that since the Supreme Court permitted recovery in a Bivens
action (i.e. an action brought against federal officials directly under the Constitution)
notwithstanding restrictive state law, Section 1983 damages were permissible here.
See id. at 1237-38 (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) and Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
118. See id. at 1238-39.
119. 769 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying Illinois law).
120. The facts were controverted and pages from the log books detailing the
incident were found missing. The evidence indicated that Bass requested medical
assistance at 11:30 p.m. on October 19, 1976, and at 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. on
October 20, 1976. He did not receive medical assistance until 8:30 a.m., when he was
found unresponsive with a weak pulse. Bass could not be revived. The court held
that the evidence was sufficient to conclude that the physician's delayed, inadequate
response to Bass' request for medical assistance resulted in the prisoner's death. Bass
v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1177-80 (7th Cir. 1985).
121. Id. at 1176.
122. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, para. 1-11 (1987).
123. Bass, 769 F.2d at 1190.
124. 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (applying California law).
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shot by two policemen. 125 His mother filed suit, recovering $100,000
for deprivation of her son's life without due process of law.' 2 6 In
addition to damages for loss of enjoyment of life, the plaintiff
one of whom
recovered punitive damages from the two officers,
27
neck.
the
of
back
the
in
Guyton
shot
deliberately
In wrongful death claims recovery of hedonic loss apart from
Section 1983 actions is severely limited because most state wrongful
death and survival statutes do not permit recovery for loss of enjoyment of life. 21 Under most wrongful death statutes, the decedent's
widow or widower and next of kin may recover fair and just compen29
sation for injuries they incur as a result of the decedent's death.'
Because these wrongful death statutes permit compensation for injuries to persons other than the decedent, the decedent's hedonic loss is
not recoverable. Survival statutes permit the decedent's personal
representative to recover damages the decedent incurred prior to
1 and the damages recovered become the property of the estate.
death, 30
Thus, a decedent's hedonic damages prior to death may be compen3
sable under a state survival statute.' '
However, many state wrongful death and survival statutes have
been interpreted to prohibit recovery for the decedent's hedonic loss.
32
a
For example, in Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center,1
father brought a wrongful death and survival action after his son was
negligently administered anesthesia during surgery.'3 The court denied
125. Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The officers
attempted to stop Guyton because of "suspicious activity." Guyton eluded them,
and a ten-minute chase ensued. Eventually, the officers rammed Guyton's vehicle,
and Guyton fled on foot. Guyton was shot by Officer Phillips from some distance
and by Officer Matthews at almost point blank range as a third officer was preparing
to handcuff the prostrate Guyton. The evidence did not show Guyton had a gun or
fired upon the police officers. Id. at 1156-59.
126. Id. at 1169.
127. Id.at 1168.
128. See Goldstein, Hedonic Damages: Awards for Loss of Life and Its Pleasures, FOR Tn DEFENSE, Nov. 1988, at 6. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, para. 1

(1989).
129. See Goldstein, supra note 128, at 6. See also Clement v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., Civ. No. 88-3793 WESTLAW Screen *12 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 1989) (WESTLAW
Allfeds library).
130. Id.
131. Id. at WESTLAW Screens *10-11.
132. 393 A.2d 1188 (Pa. 1978).
133. Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Med. Center, 482 Pa. 441, 444-45, 393 A.2d
1188, 1189-90 (1978). His five-year-old son died during a routine tonsillectomy. In
the resulting wrongful death and survival action, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
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recovery for loss of enjoyment of life, stating that the loss of life's
pleasures was simply not recoverable in wrongful death and survival
34
actions.
To date, Connecticut is the only state permitting recovery for
loss of life's enjoyment under its wrongful death statute.' 35 In Kiniry
v. Danbury Hospital,'3 6 the leading case from Connecticut, a wrongful
death action was brought against a hospital and two physicians for
negligent treatment of a head injury resulting in decedent's death.'37
The $1,800,000 general damages award included compensation for
conscious pain and suffering, lost earning capacity, and loss of
enjoyment of life.' 38 The court concluded that the substantial verdict
was not excessive, because it was proportionate to the substantial
injury which the decedent sustained. 3 9

denied recovery for the decedent's loss of the pleasure of life. The court inferred that
such damages would compensate the survivors, not the victim, and contradict
Pennsylvania's compensatory objective of awarding damages to tort victims. Id. at
446-47, 393 A.2d at 1190.
134. Id. at 448, 393 A.2d at 1191. See also Singleton v. Chung Son Suhr, No.
55367, LEXIS Screen *6 (Ohio App. May 18, 1989) (LEXIS, States library, Omni
file) (noting damages for loss of enjoyment of life are inappropriate in a wrongful
death action); Lucy v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, No. 872630, LEXIS Screen *1 (U.S. Dist. Jun. 8, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Current
file) (citing Richardson v. District of Columbia, 116 Daily Washington Law Report
2609, 2612 (1988) and granting defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of
hedonic damages, noting that "hedonic damages are not recoverable in the District
of Columbia").
135. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-555 (West 1960 & Supp. 1990). In Sanderson
v. Steve Snyder Enters., 196 Conn. 134, 491 A.2d 389 (1985), the court noted that
under Connecticut law, in actions for injuries resulting in death, a plaintiff is entitled
to "just damages together with the cost of ... medical, hospital and nursing services,
and .

..

funeral expenses." Id. at 149 n.12, 491 A.2d 397 n.12 (citing Conn. Gen.

Stat. Ann. sec. 52-555). "Just dainages" included (1) lost earning capacity, (2) loss
of enjoyment of life, and (3) recovery for conscious pain and suffering. Id. See also
Katsetos v. Nolan, 170 Conn. 637, 657, 368 A.2d 172, 183-84 (1976) (stating
Connecticut law permits recovery by decedent's estate for loss of ability to live and
enjoy life's activities).
136. 183 Conn. 448, 439 A.2d 408 (1981).
137. Kiniry v. Danbury Hospital, 183 Conn. 448, 449-52, 439 A.2d 408, 410-11
(1981). Kiniry fell down a flight of stairs in his home, suffering a wrist and skull
fracture. Kiniry was taken to the emergency room at Danbury Hospital where he was
seen by an orthopedic surgeon. Approximately five hours later, a neurosurgeon was
called and found Kiniry in a deep coma from which he never recovered. Id.
138. Id. at 460, 439 A.2d at 414-15.
139. Id. at 464, 439 A.2d at 416 (citing Pisel v. Stamford Hospital, 180 Conn.
314, 430 A.2d 1 (1980)).
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Eventually, other states may follow Connecticut's progressive
lead in permitting some recovery for hedonic loss after wrongful

death. Despite inhospitable state statutes, hedonic damages continue

to be asserted in state wrongful death and survival actions. In Clement
v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,140 a diversity action in federal court

brought pursuant to the New Jersey wrongful death and survival
statutes, the court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's request for relief

in the form of hedonic damages. The court noted that damages for
loss of enjoyment of life are potentially available under the survival
loss suffered between the time of injury and the
statute for hedonic
41
time of death.
Most courts hearing wrongful death actions brought pursuant to
state law have rejected hedonic loss as an element of damages. In
denying recovery for hedonic loss in state wrongful death claims,
courts have attempted to avoid overcompensating the plaintiff, a
primary theme behind objections to recovery for hedonic loss.
IV.

OBJECTIONS TO RECOVERY

In the cases and commentary, frequent objections to recovery for
hedonic loss fall into two general categories: defendants assert that
hedonic damages overcompensate the plaintiff and that hedonic damages cannot be measured. However, these commonly raised arguments
against recovery of hedonic loss are frequently unpersuasive.
A.

OBJECTIONS RELATING TO OVERCOMPENSATION

The most commonly cited objection to hedonic damages is that
they are duplicative of other damage awards. While some proponents
argue that hedonic damages are a separately cognizable type of

harm, 42 others assert that damages for loss of enjoyment of life are
140. Civ. No. 88-3793 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
141. Clement v. Consolidated Rail Corp., Civ. No. 88-3793, WESTLAW Screen
*14 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 1989) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
142. For example, in Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 482 Pa. 441,
451, 393 A.2d 1188, 1193 (1978) (dissenting opinion), the dissent argued that
"'lumping loss of life's pleasures' with pain and suffering" has resulted in confusion
and has blurred "each item's uniqueness and significance." The dissent noted, "[i]t
is an attempt to mix together two separate items-how do you mix oranges and
cats?" Id. (Larsen, J.dissenting). See also McGowan v. Estate of Wright, 524 So.2d
308, 311 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing)
where the dissent noted the broad language describing damages permitted in the
wrongful death statute and urged recovery for hedonic loss. The language of the
statute stated, "[T]he party . . .suing shall recover such damages as the jury may
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encompassed within awards for pain and suffering or disability. 43
These two points of view can be reconciled, however; hedonic loss is
a form of injury related to pain and suffering or disability that can
be compensated within these more traditional categories of harm.
Analyzing the characteristics of and relationship between pain and
suffering, disability, and loss of enjoyment of life demonstrates that
hedonic loss is a distinct form of injury closely related to disability
but often distinguishable from pain and suffering.
Pain and suffering encompasses the physical discomfort and
emotional trauma caused by an injury. Pain is the immediately and
physically felt effect of an injury to the body, while suffering is the
emotional response to the painful physical sensation.'" Proving pain
and suffering requires evidence of injury and accompanying emotional

response. 141

Loss of enjoyment of life, however, is not dependent on the
presence of pain and suffering. Rather, the method of proof for loss
of enjoyment of life requires evidence of (1) the plaintiff's lifestyle
prior to being injured, and (2) the more limited lifestyle of the plaintiff
afterwards.'4 Thus, proving loss of enjoyment of life involves a
"before and after analysis of impaired physical capacity,"'' 47 whereas
determine to be just, taking into consideration all damages of every kind to the
decedent.... ." Id. at 312 (emphasis in original) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13
(Supp. 1987)). The dissent supported plaintiff's argument that "there is an intrinsic
value to life and ...

its loss should be compensated." Id.

143. See, e.g., Nussbaum v. Gibstein, 73 N.Y.2d 912, 914, 536 N.E.2d 618, 619,
539 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290 (1989) (holding that "loss of enjoyment of life is not a
separate element of damages deserving a distinct award but is, instead, only a factor
to be considered by the jury in assessing damages for conscious pain and suffering");
see also Hermes, supra note 6, at 569 n.38.
At least one judge has noted the fact that damages for loss of enjoyment of life
may be duplicative in some situations and not in others. In Mariner v. Marsden, 610
P.2d 6, 17 (Wyo. 1980) (concurring opinion), it was postulated that in some cases
"loss of enjoyment" may be present as an incident of pain and suffering and/or
disability. In other cases "loss of enjoyment" can exist beyond "pain and suffering"
or "disability" and be subject to separate treatment. Id. at 17 (Rooney, J., concurring).
144. See Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of

Damages, 12 PAC. L.J. 965, 969-72 (1981) [hereinafter, Comment, Loss of Enjoyment].
145. See id. at 978.
146. Id.at 979 & n.82 (noting the "before-and-after method" may be gleaned
from looking at loss of enjoyment of life cases). See, e.g., Yosuf v. United States,
642 F. Supp. 432, 439 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (comparing victim's activities before and
after the injury).
147. Comment, Loss of Enjoyment, supra note 144, at 979.
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pain and suffering is established by focusing on the injury and the
victim's emotional response to it.148
Following this reasoning, some courts have held that loss of
enjoyment of life is distinct from pain and suffering. In Thompson
v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. ' 49 the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed a federal district court application of Tennessee law
that permitted separate awards for pain and suffering and loss of
enjoyment of life. In affirming the lower court's holding, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Pain and suffering ... and loss of enjoyment of life each
[P]ain
represent separate losses which the victim incurs ....
and suffering compensates the victim for the physical and
mental discomfort caused by the injury; and loss of enjoyment
of life compensates the victim for the limitations on the
person's life created by the injury.'5 0
Hedonic loss and disability are more closely related.151 The method
of proof for hedonic loss evinces a close relationship to disability; in
both cases, the court compares the plaintiff's physical capacity before
148. See id. Carleton Robert Cramer provides an excellent analogy for the
distinction between pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life in his article

Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Separate Element of Damages. Cramer notes:

[Clonsider the cases of two amateur gymnasts, each of whom has lost the
use of one arm. Assume the first gymnast had an arm crushed in a car
accident. In the second instance, suppose the gymnast's medical charts were
confused with those of another patient and his arm was surgically removed
in a totally anesthetized procedure. In both cases an analysis of the loss of
enjoyment of life that the victims have suffered will focus on their inability
to practice gymnastics in the future. Given equal gymnastic capabilities and
an equal involvement in the sport, their loss of enjoyment of life will be the
sami. An analysis of the pain and suffering experienced by each, however,
will differ significantly considering the disparity of the circumstances surrounding the disabling injuries. Clearly the pain and suffering experienced
by the gymnast whose arm was crushed in the car accident will be far greater
than that of the gymnast whose arm was removed surgically in the anesthetized medical procedure.
Id. at 979. Thus, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life involve different
methods of proof and refer to different types of injury.
149. 621 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1980).
150. Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824 (6th Cir.
1980).
151. For an excellent review of the relationship between damages for loss of
enjoyment of life and damages for disability, see Hermes, Loss of Enjoyment of
Life-Duplication of Damages Versus Full Compensation, 63 N.D.L. REV. 561, 565
(1987).
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and after the injury. 15 2 However, hedonic damages are not identical
to traditional damages for disability when comparing methods of
measurement. Traditionally, disability damages have compensated the
victim for his or her inability to work or lead a normal life and have
been measured under the human capital approach, in which life is
valued as a measure of production. 53 In contrast, hedonic damages
are a measure of consumption and compensate the victim for his
inability to engage in activities he formerly enjoyed, unrelated to his
ability to produce. 114 Because we do not have to produce everything
we consume, hedonic damages are not encompassed by the traditional
human capital approach to measuring damages for disability.
Although conceptually hedonic loss seems most closely related to
disability, some courts have held that loss of enjoyment of life could
be argued to the jury as a subcomponent of either disability or pain
and suffering. In Leiker v. Gafford,'5 the court explained that "loss
of enjoyment . .. is inextricably included within . . . damages for
disability and pain and suffering.' 1 56 However, the court did not
totally exclude consideration of hedonic loss in damage awards. The
court went on to hold that the plaintiff's counsel could present
testimony on loss of enjoyment of life and the jury could properly
consider it as compensable within disability or pain and suffering.,
Other courts have reached similar results. 158
The second most commonly raised objection to recovery of
hedonic damage awards is that such damages serve no compensatory
purpose where the victim is deceased or has no cognitive awareness. 5 9

152. See related discussion supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22 for a discussion of the human
capital approach. See also Kirk v. Wash. St. U., 109 Wash. 2d 448, 461, 746 P.2d
285, 292-93 (1987) (inferring damages for disability provide compensation for lost
wages and "inability to lead a 'normal life').
154. See Yosuf v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 432, 439 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (plaintiff
unable to participate in recreational activities he formerly enjoyed and awarded
hedonic damages).
155. 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d 823 (1989).
156. Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 340, 778 P.2d 823, 835 (1989).
157. Id.
158. Ferguson v. Vest, No. 87-L-207 (3d Judicial Cir. Madison Cty., Ill., Mar.
17, 1989) (permitting expert testimony on hedonic damages to be admitted under the
category of disability and disfigurement). See supra notes 84-85.
159. See McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 254, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375, 538
N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1989) (holding that damages for loss of enjoyment of life could
not serve a compensatory purpose where the comatose plaintiff has no awareness of
their loss). See also Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 482 Pa. 441, 446,
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Courts have asserted that absent life or cognitive awareness of life,
any damage award for loss of life's enjoyment becomes a windfall to
the victim's family. In view of this, some courts have held damages
6
for loss of enjoyment of life to be punitive and barred recovery.1 0

In McDougald v. Garber,61 the most recent case to address the
issue of cognitive awareness, recovery for the comatose patient's
hedonic loss was denied. In McDougald, the appeals court held that
"cognitive awareness is a prerequisite to recovery for loss of enjoyment of life."' 62 The court reasoned that where the plaintiff has no
awareness of his or her loss, damages for loss of enjoyment of life
could not serve a compensatory purpose. Because tort damages for
negligent injury are intended to compensate, not punish, the court

of life were not
concluded that damages for loss of enjoyment
163
comatose.
was
appropriate where the plaintiff
In denying recovery for hedonic loss, the McDougald court relied
on Flannery v. United States.'6 In Flannery, the FTCA plaintiff
became permanently comatose after suffering brain damage in a car
accident caused by the negligence of a government employee.16S An
award of $1,300,000 for loss of enjoyment of life was granted at trial
but reversed on appeal, because the court of appeals considered the
393 A.2d 1188, 1190 (1978) (inferring that compensation for loss of life would be
"contrary to the compensatory objective of awarding damages to tort victims.").
William W. Kurnik, attorney for the defendant in Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F.
Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), stated, "Hedonic damages ...[go] well beyond compensation and [have] no bearing on compensation." Blum, More Suing Over Lost Joy
of Life, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 17, 1989, at 24, col. 3. Kurnik also remarked, "It's not
rational. You cannot compensate a person who's dead." Tapp, Lawyers Pushing for
an Expansion of 'Hedonic' Damages, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Aug. 26, 1988, at 1, col.
6.
160. See, e.g., McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 255, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375,
538 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1989); Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir.
1983).
161. 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1989).
162. McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 255, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375, 538
N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1989).
163. Id. The court noted that "[a]n award for the loss of enjoyment of life
'cannot provide [a comatose victim] with any consolation or ease any burden resting
on him .... He cannot spend it upon necessities or pleasures. He cannot experience

the pleasure of giving it away." Id. at 254, 536 N.E.2d at 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 940
(citing Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 111, (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984)).
164. 297 S.E.2d 433 (W.Va. 1982), rev'd 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
165. Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108, 110 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
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award to be compensatory only to the victim's estate. Because damages for loss of enjoyment of life could not benefit Flannery directly,

the court held the award to be punitive, prohibiting recovery under
the FTCA.' 66

However, some courts have permitted recovery for hedonic loss
absent cognitive awareness. In an FTCA medical malpractice action,

Rufino v. United States,167 a woman sued for damages arising from
her husband's treatment at a Veteran's Administration hospital. In

holding that the patient's comatose condition did not prohibit recovery
for loss of enjoyment of life, the court of appeals relied on New York

precedent, citing the lower court decision in McDougald v. Garber.168
In Leiker v. Gafford, 69 the court permitted recovery for loss of
enjoyment of life suffered by a semi-comatose woman during the six-

year period prior to her death. 70 The court held that there was
conflicting evidence about the victim's level of consciousness and that
level of consciousness was a proper issue for the jury. In doing so,
the court affirmed the jury's award of $150,000 for hedonic loss even
7
though the victim had little or no cognitive awareness.1 1
Not every court has followed an all-or-nothing approach to
hedonic loss in cases of limited cognitive awareness. In Nemmers v.
United States,72 the court permitted recovery for hedonic loss but
reduced the damages according to the victim's level of awareness of
his loss. In Nemmers, parents filed an FTCA claim against the
government physicians who delivered their child born with mental

retardation and cerebral palsy. The couple claimed $1 million in loss
166. Id. at 111.
167. 829 F.2d 354, 356 (2d Cir. 1987). The patient entered a VA hospital with
chest pains on April 12, 1981, suffered a heart attack, and was deprived of oxygen
as a result of the defendant's negligence. He remained in a permanent comatose state
until his death on May 8, 1987. Rufino v. United States, 829 F.2d 354, 357 & nn.34 (2d Cir. 1987).
168. 132 Misc. 2d 457, 504 N.Y.S.2d 383 (Sup. Ct. 1986), rev'd, 73 N.Y.2d 246,
536 N.E.2d 372, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1989).
However, because McDougald was subsequently reversed, McDougald v. Garber,
73 N.Y.S.2d 246, 255, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375, 538 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1989), Rufino
has questionable precedential value. The Court of Appeals of New York in McDougald held that "cognitive awareness is a prerequisite to recovery for loss of
enjoyment of life." Id. Further, although they did not need to reach the issue, the
court denied recovery for loss of enjoyment of life separate from pain and suffering.
See id. at 257, 536 N.E.2d at 377, 538 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
169. 245 Kan. 325, 778 P.2d 823 (1989).
170. Leiker v. Gafford, 245 Kan. 325, 339-41, 778 P.2d 823, 832-35 (1989).
171. Id. at 346, 778 P.2d at 839.
172. 681 F. Supp. 567 (C.D. I11.1988).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

of enjoyment damages, but the court awarded only $400,000 for loss
of enjoyment of life because of the child's limited ability to comprehend his loss. 7 ' The $400,000 award was held to be compensatory,
because it could provide their son with "things" to occupy his time
74
and develop his potential to the fullest.1
Arguments can be raised in favor of permitting some measure of
recovery for hedonic loss, absent cognitive awareness. In Flannery v.
United States, 75 the lower court held that the comatose victim could
recover for his nonsentient condition, for losing the ability to enjoy
life. 176 The court held this was not duplicative, because no award had
been made for permanent disability. 77 Though overturned on appeal,
this lower court held that the victim had suffered a loss of enjoyment
of life, whether he was aware of it or not, and desired to recognize
that loss by awarding damages for loss of life's enjoyment.
Entirely barring recovery for hedonic loss where the victim is
deceased seems incongruous, because decedents are awarded damages
for pain and suffering prior to death under state survival statutes. In
permitting the decedent's estate to be compensated for the victim's
pain and suffering before death, courts have not considered the
damage award to be a windfall. Where courts allow recovery for pain
and suffering prior to wrongful death, it seems consistent to permit
recovery for any disability and/or resulting hedonic loss prior to death
as well.
Two other objections to recovery for hedonic loss relating to
overcompensation have been raised. First, some suggest that hedonic
damages provide an excuse for higher attorney fees. 71 Second, even
173. Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567, 576 (C.D. Ill. 1988).
174. Id. at 576. Under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, the state law
where the tort occurs determines the type and measure of damages recoverable.
Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567, 573 (C.D. Ill. 1988). The United States
is liable "to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." Id. at
575 (citing 28 U.S.C. Section 2674). However, under the FTCA punitive damages
are not permitted. Id. Thus, the court's award is made pursuant to both the FTCA
and State law. See id. at 577.
175. 297 S.E.2d 433, 435-436 (W.Va. 1982) (citing Nees v. Julian Goldman
Stores, Inc., 109 W.Va. 329, 154 S.E. 769 (1930)), rev'd, 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.
1983).
176. Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 435-36 (W.Va. 1982), rev'd, 718
F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
177. Id. 297 S.E.2d at 438.
178. See Blum, supra note 159, at 24, col. 2. "Perhaps the real reason for their
[hedonic damages'] new-found popularity ...

is to make more money for plaintiffs'

attorneys." Id. at 24, col. 2. Mr. Thomas Crisham of Chicago's Hinshaw, Culbertson,
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though hedonic damages may conceptually differ from other intangible damage awards, it may be argued that multiple awards of
intangibles should not be permitted. 79 Some attorneys assert hedonic
damages should not be permitted because an impermissible duplication
of damage awards already exists. 80
B.

OBJECTIONS RELATING TO MEASUREMENT

Defense attorneys frequently resist recovery of hedonic damages
by two arguments relating to the measurement of hedonic loss. First,
in view of the fact that hedonic loss cannot be precisely measured,
defendants have asserted that hedonic damages are not recoverable
because they are too speculative.'' This argument was rejected in
Sherrod v. Berry.'12 In Sherrod, the court concluded that difficulty in
measuring hedonic loss did not make the hedonic damages speculaMoelmann, Hoban & Fuller, whose firm defended a doctor in Ferguson v. Vest, No.
87-L-207 (3d Judicial Cur., Madison Cty., Ill., Mar. 17, 1989), stated that "[alnything
that is used to increase [damages] thereby increases the amount of money for the
plaintiff and plaintiffs' attorney." Id. at 24, col. 2-3.
179. In assessing damages for easily-measurable economic harm, such as medical
expenses or lost earnings, duplication is relatively easy to avoid because the itemized
damages can be compared. In contrast, multiple awards of intangibles compound the
possibility of overcompensation, because each intangible is incapable of precise
measurement. In addition, providing a check against overcompensation of intangibles
is more difficult, because assessing damages for intangibles is within the province of
the jury and damages awarded by the jury are not overturned unless they are so large
or small as to "shock the conscience." Gutierezz-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d
553, 577-78 (1st Cir. 1989).
180. Telephone conversation with Richard Roessler (Nov. 1, 1989) (Richard
Roessler is an attorney with Gundlach, Lee, Eggmann, Boyle, and Roessler of
Belleville, Illinois, who represented one of the defendants in Ferguson v. Vest., No.
87-L-207 (3d Judicial cir., Madison Cty., Ill., Mar. 17, 1989)).
Among other items of damages, the IPI-Civil (see IPI2d-Crv., supra note 73)
permits recovery for the nature, extent and duration of the injury (30.02), disability
and disfigurement (30.04), and pain and suffering (30.05). Awarding damages for
the nature, extent and duration of the injury, in addition to the other categories, has
been held to be duplicative. In Powers v. Ill. Central Gulf R.R., 91 111. 2d 375, 384,
438 N.E.2d 152, 156 (1982), the court held that a jury could not determine damages
for the nature, extent and duration of an injury separately from the other elements
of damage. The court noted, in addition, that general commentaries recognize an
instruction is duplicative if it induces a jury to award recovery for both the injury
itself and other related elements of damage. Id. at 384, 438 N.E.2d at 156 (citing 25
C.J.S. Damages § 181 (1966)).
181. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 827 F.2d 195, 205-206 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting
the defendants' arguments contesting economic testimony on hedonic loss), rev'd and
remanded on other grounds, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
182. Id. at 206.
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tive,8 3 because the rule against recovering speculative damages is
"directed against uncertainty as to cause rather than uncertainty as
to measure or extent."'1 Thus, uncertainty about the pecuniary value
of hedonic loss does not bar recovery.
Second, attorneys have questioned whether economic expert testimony should be used to measure hedonic damages at trial." 5 Economists have usually measured economic loss in tangible areas, such
as medical expenses or loss of household services, whereas intangible
losses such as pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life have
been argued by attorneys.8 6 However, in many jurisdictions economic
expert testimony on hedonic loss should be admissible. For example,
Illinois permits a liberal use of expert opinion evidence,8 7 allowing
experts wherever helpful.' 8
V.

PROPOSAL

This comment proposes that, where present, hedonic damages
are a distinct form of injury resulting from disability or pain and
suffering in personal injury claims. However, because hedonic loss is
183. Id. (citing Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F.Supp. 159, 164 (N.D. Ill.
1985)).
184. Shartel, Expert Testimony Is Admissible to Enable the Jury to consider the
"Hedonic" Value of Life in a Wrongful-Death Case, 30 Am.TRIAL LAW. A.L. REP.
408 (Nov. 1989). Note that, in Sherrod, there was no doubt that a Joliet policeman
caused the fatal injury to Ron Sherrod. Therefore, because the cause of the injury
was certain, the damages were not speculative.
185. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 86, at 3. The author, Charles E. Schmidt,
is an attorney with Mitchell, Brandon & Schmidt in Carbondale, Illinois. One writer
states that "only lay witnesses should be asked to testify." Moore, Loss of Enjoyment
of Life, an Emerging Theory of Nonpecuniary Damages, TRIAL, Sept. 1989, at 60.
Additionally, some suggest that economic testimony on hedonic loss may be detrimental to the plaintiff's case because it is "vulnerable on cross-examination."
Glennie, Economists Can Assist With Proof, Hedonic Value, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 5,
1988 (Litigation), at 17, col. 1.
186. Glennie, supra note 185, at 15, col. 1. Bruce Olson, a Milwaukee defense
lawyer, suggests that economic analysis is inappropriate in measuring intangible
losses. He states that economic analysis "usurps the function of the jury, and runs
the risk of improperly persuading them, because you've got some academic who
appears to have great credentials." Miller, supra note 1, at 26, col. 1. For other
comments objecting to the use of expert testimony in hedonic loss claims, see Moore,
supra note 185, at 60.
187. J. MmZA, ILLINOIS TORT LAW

AND PRACTICE

§ 2:6 (2d ed. 1988).

188. Id. To qualify as an expert, one need only possess "special skill or
knowledge beyond that of the average layman." J. MnmzA, 4 ILLINOIS PERSONAL
INJURY § 407:56 (1989). It is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine
whether an expert is qualified. See Buckler v. Sinclair Refining Co., 68 Ill App. 2d
283, 293, 216 N.E.2d 14, 19 (1966).
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unlikely to arise absent pain and suffering or disability, hedonic
damages should be argued to the jury within either of these categories
and no separate jury instruction need be given. In addition, courts
should permit recovery of limited general damages for hedonic loss
where the injured victim is comatose or has suffered wrongful death.
Each proposal is addressed in turn.
In personal injury claims, hedonic damages may be adequately
represented within the categories of disability or pain and suffering. 89
Hedonic loss is not identical with either of these traditional categories
of damages; it is possible to have pain and suffering or disability
without loss of enjoyment of life.'19 In this sense, hedonic damages
are not duplicative. However, hedonic loss is so closely related to
these more traditional forms of harm that it should be represented
within them.
Because hedonic loss will only arise in conjunction with some
form of disability or pain and suffering, courts should permit damages
for hedonic loss, when present, to be argued within either of these
categories. For example, in Illinois, Pattern Jury Instructions 30.04
and 30.06 could be amended to include the optional wording [and
resulting loss of enjoyment of life] or [and resulting hedonic loss],
giving the plaintiff the opportunity to argue hedonic loss within the
category of pain and suffering or disability.191 To diminish the possibility of overcompensation through overlapping damage awards, the
plaintiff could be limited to arguing hedonic loss within one of the
two categories, but not both. Permitting hedonic loss to be argued to
the jury within these traditional categories of damages will enable
189. Though hedonic loss seems most appropriately allied with disability, see
supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text, it is possible that a victim may suffer
permanent pain with considerable loss of enjoyment of life, but have little or no
disability. Though there may be problems of proof, the plaintiff should have the

option of pleading loss of enjoyment under this category of damages.
190. For example, a person could have a partial hearing loss in one ear. This
would be considered a disability but may have no effect on his enjoyment of life.
Also, during childbirth a woman experiences what some would call pain and suffering.
However, this temporary pain and suffering is associated with the joy of new life,

not hedonic loss.
191. The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, IPI2d-Civ., supra note 73, were
prepared by the Illinois Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions in 1971. In
personal injury cases, the IPI2d-Civ. provides the litigant with jury instructions he
or she may recommend the court use to aid the jury in measuring each type of

damages. Measures of damages recognized by the IPI2d-Civ. include: nature and

extent of injury (30.02), disability and disfigurement (30.04), pain and suffering

(30.05), medical expenses (30.06), loss of earnings or profits (30.07 and 30.08), and
caretaking expense (30.09).
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plaintiffs to be fully compensated, while prohibiting separate jury
instruction will give defendants some protection against excessive
damage awards.
For the comatose or semi-comatose victim in a personal injury
claim, limited general damages for hedonic loss may also be awarded
within the category of disability. The comatose patient is totally
disabled, suffering a complete loss of the pleasures of life. It is
incongruent to permit the partially disabled to recover hedonic damages, while permitting the totally disabled no recovery at all. Thus,
where there is a total lack of cognitive awareness, at least some form
of limited general damages should be given for hedonic loss.192 Giving
limited general damages for hedonic loss would vindicate the victim's
rights, one of the four purposes for awarding damages recognized by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.193 However, because special damages awarded to the comatose patient are likely to be high, permitting
no more than limited recovery of hedonic damages will avoid the
likelihood of creating a punitive damage award.
Courts should permit limited recovery of general damages for
hedonic loss in those suffering wrongful death for the same reason
that damages for hedonic loss should be awarded to those lacking
cognitive awareness in personal injury claims. Those suffering from
wrongful death have experienced a total loss of enjoyment of life;
permitting limited recovery of general damages will vindicate that loss
and partially correct the anomaly that it is "cheaper to kill than to
maim.' 94 Awarding limited general damages in wrongful death is the
one instance that may require a separate jury instruction. Hedonic
damages cannot be argued within the categories of pain and suffering
or disability if neither are pled.
Measuring hedonic loss in wrongful death is too uncertain to
permit more than a limited recovery. When measuring hedonic loss
in personal injury, the value of a disabled and/or painful life is

192. The comatose victim who recovers for hedonic loss will also be awarded
damages for his pecuniary injuries, such as medical expenses. Since these pecuniary
damages will very likely be a substantial amount, only nominal damages should be
given for hedonic loss within the category of disability. This will vindicate the rights
of the victim without overcompensation.
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 903, 907, 908 (1977). Compensatory,
nominal and punitive damages are awarded for one or more of four purposes: (1) to
give restitution for harms, (2) to determine rights, (3) to punish and deter wrongful
conduct, and (4) to vindicate parties and deter unlawful self-help. Id. at § 901.
Compensatory, nominal and punitive damages are only awarded when they tend to
carry out one or more of these purposes. Id. at § 901, comments a, b, c.
194. See related comments in Miller, supra note 1, at 9, col. 3.
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compared to the value of a normal pain-free life; 95 the economist
essentially compares two 'known' intangibles. In contrast, comparison
is more difficult in wrongful death claims. The economist can measure
the value of the decedent's life before death, but has not attempted
to measure the value of what comes after death.
In measuring damages for hedonic loss in wrongful death cases,
courts and economists are venturing into the unknown. Juries do
make awards for intangible losses, such as pain and suffering and
disability. But these intangible losses are comprehensible-made somewhat tangible-since they are part of the common experience of the
average layman. Conversely, the loss of one's life is something none
have experienced and returned to tell about. Certainly, someone
wrongfully killed has suffered a loss. However, no one knows if the
decedent is aware of his or her loss; and if there is cognitive awareness
after death, whether his or her lot has worsened or improved is
uncertain.
Considering the difficulty of comparing the two values, the value
of life before death, and value of "life" after death, it seems hard to
justify any award for hedonic loss in wrongful death. However,
considering the magnitude of the loss, which is the loss of life itself,
it seems unreasonable not to provide some measure of recovery.
Recognizing these contradictions, courts should permit limited recovery of general damages for hedonic loss in wrongful death, recognizing
the victim's loss without creating an excessive or burdensome remedy.
This comment concludes that hedonic damages may be adequately
represented and argued to the jury within the categories of disability
or pain and suffering in personal injury claims. Although hedonic
damages are not identical to these more traditional categories of
harm, they are so closely related that separate jury instruction is not
needed or appropriate. In personal injury claims, permitting expert
testimony on hedonic loss without giving a separate jury instruction
allows adequate remedy without overcompensation.
In addition, this comment proposes that limited general damages
for hedonic loss should be awarded to the victim who is deceased or
comatose. Providing such damages for hedonic loss will vindicate the
rights of the injured party and recognize his or her loss. Further,
awarding no more than limited general damages will acknowledge the
inherent difficulty in measuring the intangible value of life and avoid
the risk of creating a punitive damage award.
GRETCHEN

L. VALENTINE

195. See supra, notes 146-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
before-and-after analysis.

